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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
characterization of the plea control the court ... in its construction of the
pleading nor legal effect thereof, nor the wrong shown by the facts, nor as to
the relief or remedy to be granted... " To the writer this appears to be the
better view.
Nunc Pro Tunc ORDEs UNDER THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 1774.
The purpose of a nunc pro tunc order is to install in the record a fact
which, through mistake, oversight, or other error, has been omitted from the
record.' 3 "While a court may record an existing fact nunc pro tune, it cannot
record a fact as of a prior date when it did not then exist." 14
In the case of Cornell v. Comell,'5 the plaintiff wife obtained an inter-
locutory divorce decree from Elven Cornell in 1915. In 1930 she remarried.
Elven died in 1938, and her second husband died in 1956. The latter's will left
his residuary estate to the intervenor in the present case. The plaintiff elected
to take her intestate share. The intervenor contended that since no final judg-
ment was entered upon plaintiff's interlocutory divorce decree, her marriage
in 1930 was void. This is a suit to have that final decree entered nunc pro tunc.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and entered the order.
The Appellate Division had reversed the trial court,'0 and denied such
an order relying on the 1909 case of In re Crandall's Estate.'7 In that case,
the husband obtained an interlocutory divorce decree. He then died after the
interlocutory period had expired without a final judgment being entered. After
his death, his former attorney sought a nunc pro tune order to have such judg-
ment entered. The Court of Appeals held that Section 1774 of the Code of
Civil Procedure prevented such an order.
In the Cornell case, the plaintiff's first husband died before Section 1176
of the Civil Practice Act came into effect,' 8 therefore Section 1774 of the old
Code controls this case as well. The relevant portion provided, "Within thirty
days after the expiration of said period of three months final judgment shall be
entered as of course ... unless for sufficient cause the court in the meantime
shall have otherwise ordered." 'o
The Court in the Crandall case held that".., the entry of final judgment,
especially under the circumstances presented to us, [is not] automatic and of
course." 20 These circumstances were that the husband, who had obtained the
13. Merrick v. Merrick, 266 N.Y. 120, 194 N.E. 55 (1934).
14. Guarantee Trust Co. v. Philadelphia, Reading & N.E. R.R. Co., 160 N.Y. 1, 7, 54
N.E. 575, 577 (1899). See also, Mohrmann v. Kob, 291 NY. 181, 5-1 N.E.2d 921 (1934).
15. 7 N.Y.2d 164, 196 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1959).
16. 9 A.D.2d 11, 189 N.Y.S.2d 812 (3d Dep't 1959).
17. 196 N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578 (1909).
18. This amendment became effective September 1, 1946. The N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act
replaced the Code of Civ. Proc. in 1920.
19. The several amendments to the N.Y. Code of Civ. Proc. § 1774 did not alter this
language between the time of the Crandall case and the original divorce suit between the
Cornells in 1915.
20. Supra note 17 at 131, 89 N.E. 580 (1909).
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interlocutory decree, had made no attempt to have final judgment entered dur-
ing his life. Sometime after his death his former attorney sought to have the
final judgment entered nunc pro tune under a theory of laches with which the
Court was very unimpressed. In view of these circumstances it denied the nunc
pro tm order, reasoning that because the purpose of the three month inter-
locutory period was to enable the court to prevent collusive arrangements, auto-
matic entry of final judgment would defeat this purpose. While this reasoning
may have considered the lack of equity of the plaintiff's case, it appears either
to have ignored the words ". . as of course ... unless ... the court ... shall
have otherwise ordered" of Section 1774, or to have said that these words do
not mean what they say.
The present case recognizes the dubious accuracy of the Crandall decision,
but being reluctant to overrule it entirely, attempts to set forth certain situations
in which the Crandall case might still apply, such as denying a nunc pro tune
order where one of the parties to a divorce action has died before the three
month period has elapsed. However, all divorce actions cease on the death of
one of the parties because the relationship sought to be dissolved no longer
e.,dsts. Furthermore, no party to a divorce action who has been granted an
interlocutory decree, whether dead or alive, is entitled to final judgment until
three months have elapsed. The present decision also points out the unusual
facts of the Crandall case, which, in essence, are not so very different from the
facts of the present case.2 1 Therefore, the Court could not avoid the conclusion
that any part of that decision which conflicts with the present one must be over-
ruled. Thus, little, if any, life remains in the Crandall decision.
The Court of Appeals, in the Cornell case, ruled that since the plaintiff's
first husband did not die until after the three month interlocutory period had
expired, and since the Court did not otherwise order, the plaintiff was entitled
to a final judgment as of course. Failure to enter such judgment was a mini-
sterial mistake, and therefore it should now be entered nunc pro tune. In so
holding, the Court adopted what appears to be the majority rule, namely, that
so long as a final decree could have been entered during the lives of both parties
to the action, the death of one of the parties does not preclude nunc pro tune
entry of the judgment 2  This ruling, which will direct the remaining cases that
may arise under Section 1774 of the old Code, at least complies with the lan-
guage of this Section and probably its spirit as well.
The successor to Section 1774 is Section 1176 of the Civil Practice Act.2 3
It reads, "Three months after the entry of the interlocutory judgment ... [it]
shall become the final judgment as of course unless for sufficient cause the court
in the meantime shall have otherwise ordered." One case has stated the purpose
of this amendment as being "... to obviate the objectionable procedural con-
21. Although the equities in the Cornell case are very favorable to the plaintiff for
she did devote 26 years of her life to her second husband.
22. See 104 A.L.R. 664 (1936).
23. Supra note 18.
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sequences which might have affected the substantive rights of the parties." 24
With Section 1176 itself and this statement of its purpose in mind, the Court
of Appeals in the present case stated, as dictum, that this Section by itselt
would have required a nun pro tune order in this case if plaintiff's first husband
had not died before it became effective. This dictum, however, is not nearly so
apparent from the phrasing of Section 1176, the language being almost identical
to that of the superseded Section 1774, as it is from the new interpretation
which this Court gives to Section 1774 of the old Code.
EVIDENCE
ALLEGING PRoI CoNVICTION IN MTE INDICTMENT
Before 1959, Section 275(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided:
"The indictment shall not allege that defendant has previously been convicted
of any crime nor shall it set forth any record thereof, unless such prior convic-
tion affects the degree of the crime charged in the indictment." I
In People v. Johnson,2 defendants were convicted of the crimes of burglary
in the third degree,3 and possession of burglars' instruments after prior convic-
tion.4 On appeal they argued that the trial court committed reversible error
in allowing evidence of defendants' prior convictions to be read to the jury.
They maintained that this violated Section 275(b) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, as quoted above.
The Court of Appeals held that it was not reversible error for the trial
court to permit a stipulation as to defendants' prior convictions to be read to
the jury. In arriving at this determination, the Court reasoned that as the degree
of crime under Section 408 of the Penal Law was clearly affected by a prior
conviction, 5 the exception reserved in Section 275(b) ". . . unless such prior
conviction affects the degree of the crime charged in the indictment" applies.
Consequently, allowing the District Attorney to allege the prior conviction in
24. Johnson v. Johnson, 198 Misc. 691, 694, 98 N.Y.S.2d 336, 340 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
1. This Section was amended in 1959 (L 1959 ch. 221) adding the words "or offense"
after "of any crime" and "or is an element of such crime" after "indictment." Such terms
were not part of the statute when first brought into question in the Johnson case.
2. 8 N.Y.2d 183, 203 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1960).
3. N.Y. Penal Law § 404:
A person who: 1. With intent to commit a crime therein, breaks and enters a
building, or a room or any part of a building or; 2. Being in any building commits
a crime therein, and breaks out of the same is guilty of burglary in the third
degree.
4. N.Y. Penal Law § 408:
A person who ... has in his possession in the day or night time any engine,
machine, tool ... or implements adapted, designed or commonly used for the com-
mission of burglary, larceny or other crime under circumstances evincing an
intent to employ . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and if he has been
previously convicted of any crime, he is guilty of a felony.
5. Ibid.
